The Coalition: Two years on

A marriage of convenience consummated on the Downing Street lawn in May 2010 gave birth to Britain’s coalition government. Arm in arm, two parties united in its commitment to wipe out the budget deficit within the term of a parliament.

Yet a vow to bring stability to the country has morphed into ideological zeal. Eradicating the deficit has become an obsession. Warnings that this would be damaging to an already fragile economy have fallen on deaf ears. A plan B has never been forthcoming. Plan A is not for turning. As a consequence, Britain faces its slowest economic recovery in history.

A pig-headed refusal to countenance a new strategy, points to a government wilfully discarding the evidence in favour of a commitment to shrinking the state and slashing benefits.

Ideological fervour aside, running through its core, this is a government beset by incompetence. From policy u-turns to a bungled Budget: the most dissected and regurgitated in years. Dodgy party treasurers give off a whiff of financial sleaze; ministers accused of colluding with media barons hints at corruption of the highest order.

Class has become the stick with which to beat the Tories once again.

Nadine Dorries, Tory backbencher, has delivered the most stinging rebuke, condemning the Prime Minister and Chancellor as:

“Two arrogant posh boys who don’t know the price of milk, and who show no remorse, no contrition, and no passion to want to understand the lives of others - and that is their real crime.”

After years of thinking that class doesn’t matter, that class won’t hurt them, it has taken one of their own to bring it to the forefront again in such clinical fashion.

At every stage, at every initiative, the Lib Dems have never been far behind: active instigators, rather than passive bystanders.

Whilst many thought that they would curb the worst Tory instincts, the opposite has been true. They have bolstered them, given them free reign to embark on a series of highly unpopular and destructive policies.

The NHS reform bill, now law, showed them at their most ruthless. An Act which points to creeping privatising, and opposed by huge sways of the medical profession as: ‘complex, incoherent, and not fit for purpose...and irreversibly damaging.’

All coming soon after the release of a report in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine which labelled the NHS as one of the most cost-effective systems in the developed world, saving more lives at a cheaper rate than any country except Ireland.

After analysing data since 1980, the report’s author, Professor Colin Pritchard, maintained that:

“The government proposals to change the NHS are largely based on the idea that the NHS is less efficient and effective than other countries, especially the US.

"The results question why we need a big set of health reform proposals ... The system works well. Look at the US and you can see where choice and competition gets you. Pretty dismal results."

The Lib Dems gambled on their raison d’être: voting reform. It never came, soundly beaten in last May’s referendum, off the back of a disingenuous ‘NO’ campaign, conducted by their Tory coalition partners. Whilst right in principle, any appetite for a change in the voting system fell far down most peoples’ list of concerns.

The trebling of university tuition fees gave succor to the view that the Liberals were prepared to sacrifice everything and anything in order for a seat at the top table. It also invariably damaged the standing of their once hailed leader, Nick Clegg.

But, it all comes back to the economy. A report out last week, by one of Britain’s leading economic think tanks, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), argued that the high levels of unemployment would do ‘permanent damage to the UK's productive capacity.’

The weakness in the economy was ‘unprecedented,’ with growth this year forecast at close to zero. They added that Britain being in a double-dip recession was nothing more than a technicality:

“Small quarter-to-quarter movements are largely irrelevant to the broader picture of an economy that remains very weak.

"Our monthly estimate of GDP suggests the level of economic activity in the economy in March 2012 was the same as in September 2010.

"This clearly does not constitute a sustained recovery.”

Four years after the start of the credit crunch and global downturn, the UK economy is still 4% below its pre-crisis peak.

Embarking on austerity at all costs has come at a price. Comparisons with the US make for sober reading. Official figures for last year showed that the US economy grew by 1.7%, compared to 0.8% in the UK.

For 2012, Britain has already got off to a rocky start, with the economy shrinking by 0.2% in the first quarter of the year, and the country sinking into its longest depression for 100 years. Meanwhile, the US’s continues to rise, growing by 2.2% for the same period:

“While Obama chose to stimulate growth, Cameron chose to strangle it.”

Revered Noble-Prize winning economist, Paul Krugman, calls this ‘Cameron’s remarkable achievement:

“The defense I hear from Cameron apologists is that the austerity mostly hasn’t even hit yet. But that’s really not much of a defense. Remember, the austerity was supposed to work by inspiring confidence; where’s the confidence? Basically, the expansionary aspect should already have kicked in; it’s all contraction from here.

“[Instead], Britain will continue on a death spiral of self-defeating austerity.”

A victory for the basic, fundamental, laws of Keynesian economics.

The government can see the figures. It must look enviously over the pond, yet still refuses to change tack.

On taking office it repeated the flawed narrative that it had inherited record levels of government spending, stemmed from Labour’s mismanagement of the economy. Rather than the evidence, which showed it was the 2008 financial collapse which brought the economy to its knees.

Whilst this line convinced the electorate for a period, it has started to wear win. People want to see an alternative to cuts and anaemic growth.

Latest polls put the Tories at 29%, their lowest level of support since 2004; and it’s only taken them two years to achieve this feat. Labour are hovering around the 40% mark.

The Lib Dems face electoral oblivion unless they can distance themselves and find their own voice. Something I wouldn’t count on. Power-sharing has proven too enticing. Everything else can wait, including the next general election. Enjoy the ride whilst it lasts.

The coalition has had a shocking few weeks. One can’t help get the impression that the Conservatives are behaving like a party who were told they only had days to prepare for government, rather than the five years they’d actually had.

Incompetence pervades every level. The charge that they’re out of their depth is beginning to stick. That, and a stuttering recovery, makes the already onerous task of an outright Tory majority in 2015, that much less likely. Hopefully, Labour will be better prepared.


This article was first published by Shifting Grounds on Tuesday 8 May 2012

Time To Downgrade The Credit Ratings Agencies

"The three credit ratings agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown. The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval. Investors relied on them, often blindly...This crisis could not have happened without the ratings agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across markets and firms."

The damning verdict by America's Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (see page xxv) which, in January 2011, laid significant blame at the doors of the main credit agencies, for the credit crunch and subsequent global economic downturn of 2008.

Conclusions don't get any less ambiguous.

And yet, and yet, the chancellor still woos them, still panders to them, warning the country that last month's 'negative' outlook for Britain's triple A rating was merely 'a reality check' that must be heeded.

Whilst other countries' triple As become doubles, and triple Bs disappear into the world of the derisory "junk" status, as far as George Osborne is concerned, our own rating serves to vindicate the government's austerity project.

But, very soon, the chancellor may well find himself as the only person believing the agencies' hype.

The effects of Standard & Poor's (S&P) US downgrade last year had a negligible effect on the market's confidence in the US, and in fact led to them buying up Treasury bonds and pushing down long term interest rates. Thereby echoing similar such behaviour in the past after other so-called 'safe' investment countries (Japan and Canada) had seen their credit ratings fall.

As one leading economics commentator points out, Japan has had its credit rating downgraded several times over the last couple of decades. The result?

"Japan is now paying the lowest long-term interest rates in recorded economic history."

Better just to ignore the credit agencies, he argues.

Timothy Geithner, US Treasury Secretary, lambasted S&P for having shown "really terrible judgment and [having] handled themselves very poorly. They've shown a stunning lack of knowledge about basic US fiscal maths."

The fact that just before the downgrade they had miscalculated US debt by about $2tn gave some credence to Geithner's anger.

When France lost its S&P triple A rating, President Sarkozy reacted with disdain, calling it a non-event and saying it "changes nothing." The European Central Bank's president, Mario Draghi, has questioned the importance of the credit agencies, believing them to be a distraction. "We should learn to do without [them]," he's said.

This week, the "Big Three," (S&P, Moody's and Fitch), who collectively rate about 95% of debt, were hauled before the Treasury's Select Committee, which is conducting an inquiry into their "accountability, transparency, and methodology."

All of which are finally coming under increased scrutiny:

"When they were minor players, it wasn't a big issue, but now unelected executives with, at best, a spotty track record are shaping the future of nations, sailing through storms which they helped to create on the way to ever greater profits."

In written evidence submitted to the Committee, The Co-operative Party, which is campaigning for reforms to financial services, drew attention to the agencies' conflict of interest:

"...the largest source of income for the rating agencies are the fees paid by the very companies that the rating agencies are supposed to impartially rate."

They went on to point out that:

"Despite the fact that inaccurate credit ratings were a primary cause of the crisis, agencies remain largely unaccountable to either investors or regulators. Part of the reason for this is their assertion that they merely provide opinions and as such are protected by free speech provisions. Yet major market participants are continuously encouraged and sometimes even obligated to utilise rating agencies."

The backlash has begun.

An edited version of this article was first published by Liberal Conspiracy on Tuesday 13 March 2012

We're All Economists Now

The British/European/global economic downturn/credit crunch/crisis/recession from 2008, and now making an unwelcome return in 2011/12, seems to have piqued many peoples' interest in all things economic.

You don't need to fully understand what exactly a hedge fund does, or what is meant by derivatives or naked short selling (if only it means what it sounds like it means), or that getting a 'haircut' now has another meaning, to want to know more about the economic reality that exists in the UK at the moment.

And for that, a sound grasp of the basics is more important that being an expert of each and every intricate financial term. But, thank you BBC for this very helpful financial glossary, all the same.

Here is an attempt to makes things a little clearer:

The principal narrative of the coalition ConDem government is that they inherited a huge budget deficit; that is the amount by which government spending in a year exceeds its income, in terms of taxes and receipts.

It is also referred to as Public Sector Net Borrowing (PSNB): the total the government has to borrow each year, resulting in it racking up a deficit, measured as a percentage of GDP.

By GDP, we mean the total economic activity of a country, in terms of all the goods and services it produces. It measures the health of the economy.

The deficit taken on by the coalition was worth £156.1bn, 11.1% of GDP (p.24), which was actually around £11bn lower than the £167bn forecast for the end of the financial year 2009/10, by the then Labour Chancellor, Alistair Darling, in his final budget.

It is important to note that this figure excludes the money spent bailing out UK banks (RBS, Lloyds TSB, HBOS) during the 2008 credit crunch - a total which has fluctuated wildly from a commitment to propping them up to the tune of £1.162 trillion back in 2007, to £612.58bn by March 2010, and then down again to £456.33bn at the end of March 2011.

Then there is the UK's government debt, or its Public Sector Net Debt (PSND), which is the total amount of money the government owes. It is worked out as an aggregate figure, and is the accumulation of all the fiscal deficits, all government borrowing, accrued over previous years, and which is still to be paid off.

Thus, each year's deficit gets added to the existing debt.

The present government inherited debt of £759.5bn or 52.7% of GDP, for the end of the 2009/10 financial year, according to Treasury figures (p.95) released in March's 2011 Budget.

So, who exactly does the government owe this debt to?

In short, most of it is owed to us.

Debt can be divided into internal debt, money owed to lenders within the country, borrowed from those in the private sector, such as pension funds, investment trusts, building societies, and external debt, that owed to foreign lenders.

The UK Debt Management Office (DMO) is charged with managing the government's debt through the sale of gilts (risk-free bonds), Treasury bills, and bonds. The latter act as the government's debt security.

The government issues bonds, which are bought up by various bodies in the form of loans (debt investment), which it then has to pay back at a fixed (maturity) date, with interest.

UK government bonds are seen as relatively secure and risk-free investments as buyers know that they will always be repaid.

Pension funds and insurance companies are the biggest owners of government debt, making up almost a third of it.

The biggest increase in debt since 2007 has been caused by the bank bailouts, and the need for quantitative easing (printing money), in order for these financial interventions to have been possible.

And, about a third of debt is external, owed to overseas investors.

In order to make sense of the UK's debt and deficit figures they need to be put into context.

In historical terms, the UK had the largest budget deficit since 1945, and the biggest since the early 1990s. Its current debt stood at the highest levels since the late 1960s. History tells us that the British Empire was in fact built on debt.

However, over the last 100 years, debt levels have been higher before. A lot higher in fact: at 250% of GDP at the end of the 1940s, and over 100% during the 20s and 30s; the result of having to fund two world wars.

And, as one economics commentator points out, the enormous debt built up during the 1940s also coincided with the creation of universal healthcare and the welfare state. Rather than paralyse Britain, this was followed by three decades of strong economic growth.

How does this compare to other countries?

By the end of 2010, the UK had the third highest budget deficit of all the nations in the EU, with only Greece and Ireland worse off.

For the same period, even though the UK had above average levels of debt, it was still less than France and Germany, and came ninth overall within the EU.

It is important to recognise that the EU, and other bodies such as the OECD, an economic think tank of the world's wealthiest states, measure deficit and debt using a different methodology to the government.

For the EU, stats are compiled using methods prescribed by the 1992 "Maastricht Treaty," which advised member states to avoid excessive debt, equivalent to 60% of GDP, or deficit levels exceeding 3% of GDP.

They therefore found UK deficit levels of 11.6% of GDP, and debt worth 71.2% of GDP, for the end of the 2009/10 financial year.

Globally, the Treasury pointed to OECD stats, which in May 2010, estimated that the UK would have the highest deficit of all its members, as well as IMF forecasts predicting that the UK's 2010 borrowing would eclipse all other countries in the G20.

Final figures released by the IMF (p.121) for 2010 found the UK, pipped only by the US, in having the second highest budget deficit of all G7 and G20 nations, with Britain's excess borrowing way above advanced economies and Eurozone averages.

Yet, the IMF also showed that, when it came to government debt, Britain had the lowest levels of all G7 states (p.127), and close to average levels of the countries in the G20.

So, those are all the necessary facts and figures out of the way. Time for the blame game.

This government's main line of attack against Labour is that the latter left the country's finances in a mess.

They have made political capital out of arguing that Labour borrowed and spent too much, and didn't save during the boom years. Now in office, the coalition has committed itself to tackling and then eliminating the deficit as its main priority.

The main charge, that Labour built up an unnecessarily huge deficit, is of course true if you just look at the raw figures but ignore the context.

Labour themselves inherited a small deficit in 1997, and then achieved a budget surplus for the next five years.

But, in November 2002, Gordon Brown, as Chancellor, admitted that Britain would have to borrow to pay for a huge public spending programme, as laid out in the 2000 Spending Review, investing in services that had been chronically underfunded by the Tories, such as the NHS and education.

He was also responding to an economic downturn, caused by world events, such as the global threat from terrorism.

The real spike in the deficit comes in 2008. Borrowing leapt from 2.38% of GDP in 2007/08, to 6.75% in 2008/09, and then peaking at 11.1% in 2009/10 (p.7). Essentially, rising from £33bn to £156bn in the space of just three years.

Whilst the reckless spending charge is easy to level, it deliberately ignores several crucial factors: 2007/08 saw the beginning of a worldwide economic downturn and then recession, the worst since the 1930s, affecting almost all of the world's major economies.

It resulted in the collapse and then enormous bailout of many of the UK's high street banks, crippling the public finances.

The 2009 budget had forecast a growth in revenue. Instead, the government suffered a spectacular loss, with 2009/10 bringing in about £112bn less than they had expected.

The downturn meant higher unemployment, lower tax receipts, and more people in need of state help. A 100,000 increase in unemployment costs the Treasury about £500m, with the reverse happening when the economy is performing strongly.

This therefore required a surge in public borrowing in order to compensate.

Thus, the bulk of the deficit taken on by the coalition came as a result of events beyond Labour's control.

Once in office, the coalition has decided to run roughshod over the economic reality.

For the last 21 months or so they have pursued a series of tough austerity measures: aggressive cuts combined with huge reductions in public spending, believing that this is the only way to eat into the deficit.

This despite the raft of evidence that a weak and fragile economy requires an increase in government spending as the best way to stimulate the economy, especially as, naturally enough, in hard times, people choose to spend less. If nobody's spending, the economy comes to a standstill, or worse.

The last few years has seen a resurgence in support for Keynesian economics: the view, by the English economist, John Maynard Keynes, that fiscal stimulus (more government spending) is essential in a recession. During the Great Depression in the 1930s, he called for governments to invest in infrastructure.

Advocates of this position have consistently warned that cutting the deficit when the economy is weak is dangerously detrimental, and will only serve to harm it further.

As Robert Skidelsky, the acclaimed biographer of Keynes, explained:

"The reason for the slack [in the economy] is that the private sector is not spending enough to employ all those seeking work – whether because investment prospects are too uncertain, or because it is paying off debt. In these circumstances government spending is not at the expense of private spending: it compensates for its absence. If the government were to economise on its own spending at the same time as the private sector was spending less, the result would be a slide into even greater recession. Keynes called this the "paradox of thrift."

Paul Krugman, the celebrated Nobel Prize winning economist, has been cautioning against rapid spending cuts, both in the US and the UK, for years. He has argued that the coalition are ignoring lessons from history with their severe deficit-reduction strategy, and that such a move will fail to stimulate enough real growth:

"Fiscal austerity will depress the economy further...The sensible thing is to devise a plan for putting the nation's fiscal house in order, while waiting until a solid economic recovery is under way before wielding the axe."

"Why is the British government doing this? The real reason has a lot to do with ideology: the Tories are using the deficit as an excuse to downsize the welfare state. But the official rationale is that there is no alternative."

A stagnating US economy with stubbornly high unemployment has led even staunch Republicans to concede that Krugman may actually have a point.

He is also backed by Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, authors of the universally-praised book, This Time is Different, in which they documented financial crises in over sixty-six countries, over a period spanning 800 years.

Both agree with Krugman that fiscal adjustment is necessary, just not at the moment, or to the extent that it is being implemented.

Rogoff argued that:

"The important thing to do is structural reform. Make us [the US] grow faster. Improve our tax system, build infrastructure, education, view it as a crisis in that way [but]...I certainly don't think slashing budgets...is the way to go about business."

Instead, 21 months on, whilst sticking steadfastly to Plan A, this is the current economic reality facing Britain:

a stalling economy, unemployment the highest in 17 years, with an average of 23 applicants for each job, record numbers of people 'underemployed,' -those working part-time through lack of choice- the longest ever period of wage stagnation, with analysts warning that the Chancellor's 2011 autumn statement will see, between 2009/10 and 2012/13, real median incomes fall by 7.4%, levels not seen since the mid-1970s.

Noting a lack of any meaningful recovery has led to an increasing number of analysts to publicly question the government's chosen path.

One of Britain's leading economic think tanks told George Osborne to rethink the scale of the cuts, urging something more targeted:

"...fiscal policy is too tight, and a modest loosening would improve prospects for output and employment with little or no negative effect on fiscal credibility."

Another called for spending cuts to be aligned to economic growth, and fiscal consolidation to be less severe in a year where growth is forecast to drop below 1.5%. Cuts should be slowed until the economy was stronger and able to absorb them.

And in recent months, murmurings from various international bodies have got louder, with warnings that austerity drives are in fact harming, rather than healing, sick economies.

This month, the leaders of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, expressed concern at over-aggressive deficit reduction programmes, and issued a joint plea for governments to:

"...manage fiscal consolidation to promote rather than reduce prospects for growth and employment. It should be applied in a socially responsible manner."

Finally, the public are starting to turn on the government, with a recent poll finding 59% of voters backing a slowdown in spending cuts.

The trouble for Labour is that more people blame them for the state of the economy than the coalition's cuts.

In spite of several months of gloomy economic news, and despite the gathering calls for a Plan B, the government seems more determined than ever to press on, with the downturn used as cover for an irreparable and ideological shrinking of the state.

This article was first published in three parts by Left Futures. Part 1 appeared on Monday 30 January 2012, part 2 on Tuesday 31 January 2012, and part 3 on Wednesday 1 February 2012.

This article was also published in two parts by Left Foot Forward. Part 1 appeared on Saturday 4 February 2012, and part 2 on Sunday 5 February 2012.

The EU: Getting Harder to Defend

Defending the EU is unlikely to win you many votes nowadays, if it ever did. It’s a bit like immigration: even the most blinkered could probably force themselves to see its benefits, but it’s just a lot more convenient and safe to rail against both, whilst politically of course being a sure vote winner.

David Cameron’s ‘veto moment’ won instant plaudits from 62% of those polled straight after last week’s Brussels summit. On the ‘In/Out’ question, almost half would support Britain’s withdrawal from the EU if asked today, against only 33% standing firm in the ‘Yes to the EU’, camp.

For all their posturing, a Labour government would have probably done what the Prime Minister did.

If Europhiles, such as myself, have been left aghast at what has happened, we shouldn’t really be that surprised. Standing up for the EU can often feel like a losing and lonely battle.

The British have always spoken of “Europe” as if it were something which existed elsewhere; an alien and remote entity, forgetting that we are also part of it, whether we like it or not. That may not be always the case with the EU.

But, for all its faults, and there are many, a future sliding further and further away from it is not something those on the left should be relishing.

Europhiles have never really been vocal or convincing enough in praising the EU. Just hiding behind words such as ‘jobs,’ ‘growth,’ and ‘prosperity,’ as evidence, doesn’t cut it with the electorate. Concrete examples have been sorely lacking. Here’s a handy list to help.

Commenting after UKIP’s strong showing at the 2004 elections to the European Parliament, The Independent wrote that:

“So used have we become to these [EU] advantages, that we forget to mention them. But they belong in the political debate.”

It could be argued that some of the policies to have come out of the EU have been far more progressive, especially in terms of workers and consumers rights, that those ever passed by successive British governments. At least, there is a gold standard with which all governments must respect.

Yet, if pro-Europeans have been reluctant to wear their ‘Europeanness’ with pride, then maybe it’s because they never really believed it.

John Harris quotes this passage from one of Tony Blair’s biographies, neatly summing up Blair’s reticence to Europe. He was:

“…a pragmatic and competent manager of Britain's membership of the union without ever committing himself fully to it and…without winning, or even entertaining, the argument in favour of membership with his own electorate.”

Certainly, its democratic deficit harms its reputation, and makes it that much harder for its supporters to stick up for.

A week later, things have become to look a little clearer. The debate has already started to shift away from the narrow focus on Britain’s veto, and the implications in using it, to the wider consequences of what was exactly put forward in Brussels.

In essence, we are confronted with two challenges: Britain’s isolation from its EU partners, and where this leaves the left.

And for the left the picture is pretty bleak.

As far as the BBC’s Paul Mason is concerned, what was drawn up would make US Republicans swoon and dance with joy:

“…by enshrining in national and international law the need for balanced budgets and near-zero structural deficits, the eurozone has outlawed expansionary fiscal policy.”  

The proposed EU treaty has to all intents and purposes “buried Keynesianism.”

Everything many on the left have been arguing against in recent months has found its way onto the ‘Merkozy doctrine’:

“What is proposed, amounts to the same old mantra of “fiscal discipline”, based upon the Stability and Growth Pact that was flouted from the start, but this time brutally enforced with painful sanctions and accompanied by dilution of democracy in the weaker nation states.”

With perfect timing, Tuesday brought forth more grim news for Greece. Severe austerity has widened their budget deficit and deepened its recession.

In other words, from a left-wing perspective, ludicrous though it may sound, one could argue that in fact David Cameron may have ended up making the right decision for all the wrong reasons.

Of course Cameron’s reasons for opposing were more to do with protecting the City of London from tighter financial control, whilst he breathtakingly ignores the calamitous lessons of 2008 and the perils of loose regulation.

And yet, he may have badly miscalculated.

One analyst believes that Cameron’s grandstanding could spectacularly backfire. Rather than protect the interests of the City, his stance could have the opposite effect and make the UK more vulnerable to EU law.

Furthermore, Eurozone partners will take great delight in punishing Britain:

“Far from defending the City against ill-conceived initiatives originating in Brussels, the government may actively invite them. The reason is that it has marginalised itself politically, and that it has only increased long-standing suspicions in the rest of Europe that British Euroscepticism and the City of London are natural bedfellows.”

And this form of retribution could materialise in the form of the much resisted financial transactions tax.

This past week has left the EU, and its supporters on the left, with something of a conundrum. Owen Jones rightly argues that it shouldn’t just be the job of the right to challenge it.

If an attachment to the EU borders on the romantic for some, for others it has been a priceless weapon against nationalism.

As one commentator noted, on his last assignment in Brussels, “…many of Europe’s worst follies can be blamed on the selfishness and cynicism of governments, not Brussels bureaucrats.” Last week’s defiant act by the PM being just the latest example.

The EU is about to enter another new phase. Whether we like what happens or not, we’re going to be powerless to do much about it from the outside looking in. As Tory leader, William Hague liked to crow that Britain should be in Europe, not run by Europe.

Cameron’s veto has meant that we’ll be out of Europe, but run by it: virtually excluded from all the key decision-making, without influence, yet still answerable to it.

It also leaves the left vulnerable in terms of safeguarding its own political and economic interests, whether they be at home or abroad.

Defending the EU just got that little bit harder.

This article was published by Left Foot Forward on Saturday 17 December 2011

An edited version of this article was first published by Left Futures on Thursday 15 December 2011

What Governments say, and what Traders say

The video below is well worth watching, if only to highlight what kind of reality traders -and the rest of the financial sector - inhabit. Forget "education, education, education." What we now need more of is "regulation, regulation, regulation."

You have to admire his candour/arrogance, but I'm pretty appalled, and slightly terrified, that these people clearly have such a sway over our economy. Every government in the world should be forced to watch this clip; so that they can probably shrug their shoulders, tell us how much the private sector contributes to the economy, and then do nothing.